The proposed Constitution (Twenty-seventh Amendment) Act, 2025 is being presented as a technical legal reform — a move to modernize Pakistan’s constitutional framework and bring clarity to certain judicial provisions. But strip away the legal polish, and a far more consequential reality emerges: this bill is a quiet constitutional coup, one that could formally institutionalize military influence in Pakistan’s judicial structure under the guise of reform.
For decades, Pakistan’s establishment has learned that direct interventions — coups, dismissals, and emergency proclamations — carry reputational costs both at home and abroad. The world no longer tolerates generals in uniform seizing power in broad daylight. So the method has changed. Instead of tanks on Constitution Avenue, the preferred route now is legislative manipulation — legal amendments that achieve the same control, but with parliamentary signatures instead of boots on the ground.
The 27th Amendment, if passed, will mark the culmination of this quiet evolution.
A New Court — and a New Chain of Command
At the heart of the proposed amendment lies the creation of a new body: the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC). The bill seeks to replace mentions of the “Supreme Court” with “Federal Constitutional Court” in key articles of the Constitution — including those governing disqualification of legislators (Article 63A), judicial conduct (Article 68), and even the President’s oath of office (Article 42).
That last change may seem symbolic, but it is deeply political. The President of Pakistan, under Article 42, currently swears allegiance to the State of Pakistan. The amendment proposes substituting the word “Pakistan” with “Federal Constitutional Court.” In plain language, this would mean that the President’s allegiance shifts — from the state itself to a judicial institution whose formation, membership, and functioning are yet undefined. This is not a minor technicality; it is a redrawing of constitutional loyalty.
The move effectively repositions the FCC as a super-judicial entity — one that sits above or alongside the Supreme Court, capable of interpreting the Constitution in ways that align with the establishment’s broader agenda. If the judges of this new court are to be appointed through executive or establishment channels, Pakistan will be left with a parallel judiciary that answers not to the people or the Constitution, but to power.
The Supreme Court in the Crosshairs
The amendment cannot be understood in isolation. It comes at a time when the Supreme Court has increasingly confronted the establishment’s political designs — from election delays to military trials of civilians, and from enforced disappearances to civilian supremacy debates. The judiciary, despite its divisions, has in recent months shown flickers of independence, occasionally daring to push back against the entrenched military influence that shadows every institution in the country.
For the establishment, such defiance is intolerable. Hence, rather than confronting the Supreme Court directly — which would trigger domestic and international backlash — the strategy is to circumvent it. The Federal Constitutional Court serves precisely that purpose: to dilute the authority of the existing judiciary, fragment its jurisdiction, and ensure that the final word on constitutional matters rests with a body more aligned with the status quo.
It’s not the first time this has been attempted. Pakistan’s history is littered with doctrines of “necessity” and “reform” used to legitimize authoritarian control. From the Provisional Constitutional Orders of General Musharraf to the Eighth Amendment under General Zia, the playbook has always been the same: rewrite the Constitution to suit the regime, then claim legality through parliamentary ratification. The 27th Amendment follows this pattern almost to the letter.
The Illusion of Reform
Supporters of the bill argue that the creation of the Federal Constitutional Court will help depoliticize the judiciary, improve constitutional adjudication, and ease the Supreme Court’s case burden. But this is a deceptive narrative.
“Depoliticization” in Pakistan has often meant removal of democratic oversight. “Efficiency” becomes a euphemism for centralized control. And “judicial reform” is too often used to justify weakening the independence of judges who refuse to fall in line.
If the true intention were to strengthen judicial efficiency, the government could have expanded benches, increased resources, or modernized court processes. Instead, it seeks to build an entirely new institution — one whose structure conveniently allows for control from above. The logic is simple: if you cannot tame the Supreme Court, create a new one that you can.
A Legal Structure for Unchecked Power
One must also consider the timing. The bill’s introduction coincides with growing tension between civilian politics and the establishment. The judiciary has become the only space — however imperfect — where state power is still contested. Silencing it, therefore, becomes crucial.
By inserting the phrase “Federal Constitutional Court” into provisions relating to presidential oaths, parliamentary conduct, and financial governance, the amendment broadens the FCC’s reach beyond the courtroom. It effectively integrates this new court into every arm of the state, giving it constitutional recognition in matters from legislation to executive authority.
In doing so, the 27th Amendment would transform the judiciary from an independent branch into a subsidiary of the establishment’s architecture — constitutionalizing the very influence the Constitution was meant to prevent.
A Familiar Pattern, A Dangerous Precedent
What is unfolding now is not new. Each time the military establishment faces judicial resistance, it resorts to legal engineering. The judiciary has been suspended, reconstituted, and purged before. But this time, the approach is subtler and therefore more dangerous. There are no emergency decrees or martial law proclamations — only amendments and explanations, drafted in precise legalese. It is authoritarianism in parliamentary language.
This new phase of control also reflects the establishment’s understanding of optics. Internationally, open takeovers are unsustainable. So the focus has shifted to “lawfare” — the use of legal mechanisms to entrench power. When the generals legislate through politicians, they achieve what coups once did, but without the headlines or sanctions.
What’s at Stake
The implications of the 27th Amendment go far beyond judicial semantics. If enacted, it will:
- Undermine judicial independence by sidelining the Supreme Court.
- Blur constitutional accountability, as the FCC’s allegiance will lie with those who create it.
- Erode civilian supremacy, by giving the establishment a permanent institutional foothold in constitutional interpretation.
- Set a precedent for further constitutional tampering under the pretext of reform.
It will also deepen public cynicism toward democratic institutions. When courts are seen as extensions of power rather than protectors of rights, citizens disengage — and that disengagement is precisely what authoritarian systems rely on.
Conclusion: The Law of Control
The 27th Amendment is not an isolated bill; it is part of a larger project — the gradual normalization of military guardianship over the state. By embedding control into the legal fabric of the Constitution, the establishment no longer needs to impose martial law; the law itself becomes martial.
Pakistan’s political elite may convince themselves that this amendment is a harmless compromise, a necessary “adjustment” to stabilize governance. But history offers a warning: once a state begins to legislate obedience into its Constitution, it loses both law and legitimacy.
The real challenge before Parliament, the judiciary, and the public is not just to oppose this amendment, but to recognize the method behind it — the quiet, procedural, legalistic capture of democracy. Because the new coup does not come with boots and bayonets. It comes with clauses, sub-clauses, and neatly drafted bills.
And that, perhaps, is the most dangerous kind of coup of all.
