Abdul Basit Afghanistan
Despite the consensus among all stakeholders to end the Afghan war through a politically negotiated settlement, the road to peace in Afghanistan remains elusive. In fact, it seems that making peace in Afghanistan is more difficult than waging a war. The Taliban and Kabul’s diametrically opposed perceptions of peace and the post-war order in Afghanistan further complicate the negotiation process. The government in Kabul expects the Taliban to recognise the existing constitution and governing structure as legitimate. On the other side, the Taliban aim to transform Afghanistan into a theocracy in which the incumbent dispensation would be a “non-Taliban junior partner.”
In December 2019, US Special Representative for Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad paused the revived US-Taliban negotiations in Qatar following an attack on the Bagram military base. Khalilzad demanded a temporary ceasefire from the Taliban ahead of the expected deal to verify the militant movement’s ability to deliver on its promises and demonstrate its desire for peace. Despite showing their willingness for a week-long ceasefire to finalise the deal, the Taliban have since backtracked from their commitment. Their Qatar office spokesperson Suhail Shaheen has dismissed any possibility of a ceasefire before the US-Taliban deal.
Given four decades of conflict in Afghanistan, war is not just a way of life for the Taliban but also a unifying factor and source of legitimacy. Agreeing to a ceasefire without a deal with the US will not only dent Taliban’s ideological legitimacy, but it
will also put their organisational coherence under tremendous strain, furthering cleavages between the pro-talk and pro-fight factions.
Given four decades of conflict in Afghanistan, war is not just a way of life for the Taliban but also a unifying factor and source of legitimacy
The Taliban’s ideological flexibility and accommodation towards a range of political and security issues is driven by their quest for legitimacy and recognition. The militant movement’s decision-making process is based on three issues: military imperatives, political ramifications and religious suitability.
The Taliban are fully aware of the fact that their legitimacy at local, regional and global levels has been due to their military victories and fighting capability. So the talk-fight approach will continue until a deal is secured with the US. The Taliban’s primary purpose is to ensure complete withdrawal of foreign troops by any means: a peace deal, fighting or waiting out the US through a combination of the two approaches.
It is also important to keep in view that the Taliban see negotiations with the US and the Afghan government separately. A US-Taliban deal has to precede the Kabul-Taliban dialogue. Even if the Taliban agree to some form of a ceasefire with the US, they will not enter into a truce with the Afghan government whom they consider illegitimate and an American puppet.
The Taliban’s ideological rigidity and political inflexibility show their inability to evolve as a political actor. Unlike the Lebanese Hezbollah or the Palestinian Hamas, the Taliban are not ready for a mainstream political life. At the same time, the narrow and weak Afghan political mainstream is also not robust enough to incorporate the Taliban. Reforms in the Taliban movement regarding female education, human rights, freedom of speech and preserving the post 9/11 progress in various sectors in Afghanistan are adjustments in their ideological framework without transforming into a full-fledged political party practicing democracy.
Their reluctance to enter a ceasefire without an agreement with the US also underlines the fear that the pro-fight faction might split off to continue jihad under the banner of the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK). In 2019, the Taliban’s Rahbari Shua appointed co-founder of the movement Mullah Ghani Bradar as the head of Qatar political office with a hope that the military commanders and fighters will trust his decisions and listen to his advice. Inclusion of Anas Haqqani, younger brother of military commander Sirajuddin, in Qatar negotiation team after his release in the prisoner swap was also aimed at bolstering links between Taliban’s political and military commanders.
Taliban’s leadership fears that it will be difficult to mobilise fighters once they lay down their arms. The experience of former warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, chief of Hezb-e-Islami, is not lost on them. Hekmatyar surrendered in 2017 and entered into a political deal with Kabul but he has struggled to remain politically relevant.
A recent interview of Suhial Shaheen has also offered important insights into Taliban’s idea of an inclusive government and power sharing in the post-war Afghanistan. They are still wedded to the notion of forming a Shariah-based government in Afghanistan. Also, their conception of an inclusive political order envisages the current government as a non-Taliban junior faction. The Taliban are ready to allow women education and their participation in public and professional life within the Shariah framework.
What happens to the deal is not as important as what happens after the deal in Afghanistan. Moreover, a US-Taliban deal is confined to the withdrawal of foreign troops in return for guarantees not to host global militant groups in Afghanistan. The more pressing issues highlighted above have been reserved for the intra-Afghan dialogue. The price of failing Afghanistan for local, regional and international stakeholders will be enormous and collective.
The author is a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Singapore. He can be reached at [email protected]
