Eerishika Pankaj is the head of research and operations director at the Organization for Research on China and Asia (ORCA) , a Delhi-NCR-based think tank.
“We are one of the few, if not the only, think tanks in India that focus on domestic Chinese policymaking and how it shapes external actions by Beijing,” she says. The organization produces a variety of products, including special issues, dashboards, podcasts, articles and a daily newsletter.
In 2023, Pankaj participated in the U.S. State Department-sponsored Quad Leaders Lead On-Demand program , which was designed to establish a coalition of think tank leaders. The program’s goal was to align messaging on important aspects of Quad collaboration, enhancing understanding among host governments and other stakeholders about the advantages of the Quad partnership. It included skill-building sessions that focused on trends in research, adjusting scholarly content to various platforms and audiences, improving messaging, and connecting with communities.
Excerpts from the interview.
Please describe briefly your work at ORCA.
I founded ORCA in 2021 as a nonpartisan research institute focused on producing policy-oriented analysis on contemporary Chinese domestic politics, foreign policy, economy, defense strategy, and sociocultural behavior. We aim to understand China’s policymaking objectively, rather than approaching it from a lens of competition or threat perception. We have in-house projects like the India-China Trade Dashboard, Episodes of Cultural Exchanges, work on the Chinese Communist Party, special issues on Indian soft power in South Asia and transboundary water politics. Since 2023, we have convened a dialogue-driven China-focused annual conference, the Global Conference on New Sinology.
Tell us about your experiences during the Quad program.
It was an eye-opening experience. Traveling to the United States, Japan and Indonesia as part of this exchange program added immense value. Seeing the policy debates unfold firsthand and engaging directly with scholars and policymakers gave me a deeper appreciation of how each country perceives the Indo-Pacific.
I observed that while there is a shared commitment to a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” the interpretation of this vision varies. Japanese scholars and officials emphasized the Quad’s role in fostering economic security and supply chain resilience, while U.S. policymakers underscored technological cooperation and deterrence.
Overall, the program refined my view that the Quad’s greatest strength lies in its ability to shape norms—not just through strategic coordination but by setting precedents in security, transparency and maritime governance.
In what ways did the exchange program contribute to your professional growth?
My time in the program directly contributed to my published work on norm diffusion in the Indo-Pacific which I am still expanding. It also strengthened my understanding of how Quad countries align on issues while maintaining flexibility in their individual threat perceptions. I believe this work is crucial for assessing how mini-lateral groupings redefine global governance, offering a new lens to evaluate their long-term impact on the Indo-Pacific order.
The Quad’s influence extends beyond hard power by embedding key principles—like transparency, rule of law and freedom of navigation—into the broader Indo-Pacific security architecture. Some of my work after the program underscores how the Quad is shaping strategic discourse rather than merely reacting to external pressures.
A key highlight of the program was a workshop in Washington, D.C. by Paul Franz on “Policy Storytelling,” which explored techniques for strategic communication, including visual abstraction and multimedia messaging. I remember we found these insights particularly useful, and I integrated some of these approaches into my think tank’s operations to enhance outreach and policy impact.
How do you see the U.S.-India partnership shaping the Indo-Pacific security landscape?
The U.S.-India Comprehensive and Global Strategic Partnership is shaping the Indo-Pacific security landscape by institutionalizing strategic convergence while maintaining flexibility in engagement. Both countries are strengthening a networked security framework through deepening defense ties, co-production agreements like the GE-414 jet engine deal, and expanded joint military exercises such as Malabar and Tiger Triumph. These initiatives enhance interoperability while signaling a commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.
India’s engagements in the Quad ensure that the grouping remains an inclusive norm-setting entity rather than purely security-focused organization. Its leadership in maritime domain awareness initiatives, like the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative, complements U.S. efforts to secure open sea lanes. Additionally, India’s role in bilateral and trilateral partnerships, including the U.S.-India-Japan and U.S.-India-Australia partnerships, reinforces flexible regional coalitions.
By strengthening regional capacity in maritime security, technology governance, and infrastructure finance, the United States and India are creating sustainable alternatives to Beijing’s influence.
What role does India’s engagements in the Quad play in strengthening U.S.-India defense and security cooperation?
India’s engagement in the Quad has accelerated a redefined U.S.-India security relationship, shifting from traditional defense cooperation to a strategic, technology-driven and diplomatically agile partnership. In the next few years, India’s role in the Quad can institutionalize its security ties with the United States in an adaptive framework.
The Quad Indo-Pacific Logistics Network, which enhances joint logistics and disaster response, is an early example of how India and the United States are synchronizing defense efforts beyond traditional exercises like Malabar.
Similarly, the Semiconductor Supply Chains Contingency Network has fostered deeper defense industrial collaboration, paving the way for India to co-develop and co-produce advanced defense technologies with U.S. firms. In maritime security, India’s Information Fusion Center–Indian Ocean Region has become a key node in the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness initiative, allowing real-time intelligence sharing and increasing India’s role in regional maritime security frameworks.
What potential do you see for deeper U.S.-India security engagements, particularly in securing supply chains?
The potential for deeper U.S.-India security engagements, particularly in securing supply chains, lies in their shared strategic imperative to build resilient, diversified and secure networks that reduce dependencies on single-source suppliers, particularly from China. The Semiconductor Supply Chains Contingency Network already represents a significant step in addressing vulnerabilities in the global chip supply chain, with India emerging as a critical partner in semiconductor manufacturing and assembly. Future collaboration could expand to joint investments in semiconductor fabrication, advanced packaging, and rare earth processing, where India’s manufacturing potential and skilled workforce align with U.S. technological leadership.
The future of U.S.-India supply chain security cooperation will likely include joint efforts to set standards for trusted technologies, expanding secure Open Radio Access Networks, and strengthening cybersecurity measures to safeguard critical infrastructure.
As geopolitical competition intensifies, the United States and India have an opportunity to institutionalize these efforts through bilateral industrial security agreements and supply chain resilience dialogues, ensuring a long-term, mutually beneficial security and economic partnership. (Deepanjali Kakati)
The article was first published in SPAN
https://spanmag.state.gov/strategic-ties-shaping-stronger-security
