Bangladesh is entering one of the most perilous phases in its political history. The death sentence handed to former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has ripped open the fragile stability of the past decade and pushed the country toward a dangerous crossroads ahead of the 2026 elections.What once looked like a political contest now resembles a battle over democracy’s survival, the rise of radical networks, and the reshaping of South Asia’s strategic balance. And India sits squarely at the centre of this moment.
The verdict against Hasina is not merely a legal milestone; it is the culmination of two years of systematic institutional capture.
Awami League structures have been dismantled across districts, secular political voices weakened, and Jamaat-aligned groups have inserted themselves into key institutions.
Their most worrying advance has been in the education sector, where university leadership has shifted sharply toward actors aligned with political Islam.
This gives them ideological influence over the next generation—and the ability to mobilise street power if their dominance is challenged.
Against this backdrop, the 2026 elections now face a fundamental question: can they be held at all
With the bureaucracy intimidated, law enforcement compromised, and radical groups growing bolder, any attempt at restoring democratic order risks triggering orchestrated violence. Jamaat networks appear to be preparing for precisely that — a street-level showdown that could keep citizens away from the polls and push the state toward a theocratic framework by default.
In this environment, India cannot pretend neutrality. Bangladesh is not just a neighbour; it is a cultural and civilisational extension of India, tied by language, history and shared memories of 1971.
A Bangladesh captured by extremist networks or geopolitical rivals would endanger India’s security, its eastern frontier, and the stability of the broader Bay of Bengal region.
India’s first priority must be to press for an inclusive political process. Any credible election in 2026 is impossible without the participation of the Awami League. Excluding the country’s largest secular-democratic force would leave the political field entirely to Islamist groups and would all but ensure an irreversible ideological shift. New Delhi need not pick favourites, but it must ensure that democratic space remains intact.
Equally critical is the question of Sheikh Hasina’s safety. The 2013 India–Bangladesh Extradition Treaty gives New Delhi the legal basis to refuse any request for her return. But the issue goes far beyond legalities.
Sending Hasina back into an environment designed to eliminate her politically would amount to validating a process aimed at erasing the last major bulwark against radical consolidation.
Protecting her is, in effect, protecting the possibility of secular politics in Bangladesh.
Security cooperation will also have to be dramatically intensified.
The risks of cross-border infiltration, the regrouping of Pakistan-backed elements, and the revival of extremist modules are real. Intelligence-sharing and border coordination must move from episodic exercises to a daily operational discipline.
India cannot afford radicalisation spilling into West Bengal, Assam or the Northeast—regions already sensitive to demographic and ideological shifts.
Economic stability is another front where India must step in. With political paralysis deepening, Bangladesh’s economy is vulnerable to shocks that could fuel unemployment, social unrest and migration pressures.
China is already manoeuvring to exploit Dhaka’s vulnerabilities through infrastructure financing, debt leverage and elite bargains. India must counter this by strengthening cross-border trade, power-grid reliability, and targeted economic stabilisation.
This is strategic investment, not charity.
What makes this moment especially dangerous is the near-silence of Western powers.
Into that vacuum is emerging a China-backed, Islamist-inclined political architecture that sees Bangladesh not as a partner but as a corridor ,for leverage, for influence, and for access to the Bay of Bengal.
If India does not move decisively, others will shape Bangladesh’s future—and that future may not align with democratic stability or regional security.
Above all, Indian policymakers must recognise one crucial truth: ordinary Bangladeshis still trust India more than any other country for stable, development-oriented partnership.
This trust—rooted in proximity, shared history and India’s record of supporting economic progress—is India’s most powerful asset, and its greatest responsibility.
South Asia is watching a pivotal moment unfold. Over the next year, Bangladesh will either reclaim its democratic identity or slide into a radical-authoritarian hybrid.
The consequences for India will be immediate and profound. A destabilised Bangladesh would inflame tensions along India’s eastern frontier, empower anti-India networks and alter the region’s strategic landscape.
The choice before New Delhi is stark. Caution could let Bangladesh drift into chaos. Engagement, which is firm, principled and proactive, offers the only path to stabilising both Bangladesh and the neighbourhood.
(The writer is a former diplomat. Views are personal.)
